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Abstract
China has long taken the principle of non-intervention as its diplomatic dogma 
and major rhetorical instrument. However, its non-intervention policy is flexible 
in facing certain international interventions. This article attempts to explain why 
the behavior of China’s foreign policy varies in its degree of consistency with the 
principle of non-intervention by examining China’s attitude and behavior toward 
different cases of illegal intervention. China’s response to a specific intervention 
is prudent decision making intertwined with strategic considerations at the 
international level and with national interests at the domestic level. A theoretical 
framework based on the IR theory of neo-classical realism is developed to explore 
the causal mechanism underlying China’s non-intervention policy. Three cases, 
namely, NATO’s bombing of the FRY regarding Kosovo, the Iraq War, and the 
Russian intervention in Ukraine over Crimea, are examined to test the 
arguments.
Introduction
The principle of non-intervention in the domestic or territorial jurisdiction of 
other states has been taken as an international norm enshrined in international 
statements and declarations. However, interventionist activities are hardly 
uncommon in world politics as intervention is an endemic feature of contemporary 
international arrangements (Bull, 1986, p.181). Experts have concluded that 
intervention is the “modern social practice” in the history of international 
relations (IR).1 Military intervention is the most extreme and most coercive form 
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of intervention, and it has been prevalent on the international scene. Scholars 
have long wrestled with the normative and empirical issues of military 
intervention, focusing on who have the legitimate power and the right to intervene 
in whom for what reason. In the post-Cold War era, international military 
interventions (IMI) take place for various reasons, such as human rights, regional 
and international stability, and the value of liberalism. The majority of these 
interventions have been justified as benevolent and positive actions, making them 
widely accepted by sovereign states. However, some interventions are strikingly 
controversial and have been identified as illegal because of the aim of the 
intervention or the measures adopted by the intervening states.
Discussions on military intervention are important, and the field of IR never 
lacks literature on IMI. Scholars have investigated the motivations of intervening 
states. Some of them emphasized the interest and ideology of intervening 
countries (Morgenthau, 1967), and others discussed the influencing factors, 
including ethnic affinities between intervening states and targets (Saideman, 
1997; Gleditsch, 2007), regional and international order (Regan, 1998; Little, 
2013), types and longitude of the issue attracting foreign interventions (Pearson, 
1974), and their comprehensive combinations (Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008). 
Research applying statistical methods has focused on the domestic political 
systems of intervening states and target states to explore the correlation between 
regime characters and interventions (Bélanger, Duchesne, & Paquin, 2005; 
Kisangani & Pickering, 2008; Koga, 2011).
Examining cases of illegal intervention is significant in IR. First, 
reconsidering illegal intervention, particularly illegal acts that conform to moral 
justification, will “contribute to the moral improvement of the international legal 
reform” and thus promote the development of international norm (Buchanan, 
2001, p.676). Scholars of international law have debated on the normative issue of 
the legality of using force, especially in the case of humanitarian intervention 
(Gray, 2008; Peevers, 2013; Sampford, 2013). Most of their studies have focused on 
specific cases, such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Tesón, 2005; Weller, 2010). 
Second, the foreign policy formulations of different countries can be clearly 
investigated through their responses to these interventions. However, discussions 
on the foreign policy of various states toward illegal intervention are far from rich.
This article adopts the latter meaning and focuses on China’s case. China is 
1. See discussions in the special volume surrounding intervention and the ordering of the 
modern world in the academic journal Review of International Studies, Volume 39, Issue 05, 
December, 2013.
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distinct because it is one of the permanent members (P5) of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), and its decision affects whether or not the use of force 
will be legitimately instigated. In addition, China frequently holds opposite 
opinions to the interventionist initiatives of Western countries, and its responses 
to IMI prima facie appear dramatically intransigent and critical. However, China’s 
responses to different military interventions are not identical. Rather, China 
astutely practices the non-intervention policy in dealing with various 
international interventions. Therefore, the examination of China’s reactions to 
IMI demonstrates its normative judgment, consideration of cost and benefit, and 
preference and perceptions when facing a possible intervention.
Previous works on China’s non-intervention policy toward IMI emphasize 
China’s peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and activities for protecting its overseas 
properties and nationals (Gill, 2007; Gill & Huang, 2009; Karlsson, 2011; 
Duchâtel, Bräuner, & Hang, 2014). However, comparatively little research has 
focused on China’s non-intervention policy toward the singular category of 
military interventions, that is, illegal intervention. This article attempts to fill this 
gap and explain why the behavior of China’s foreign policy varies in its degree of 
consistency with the principle of non-intervention in different cases of illegal 
intervention. By doing so, the following questions need to be solved: Under what 
conditions is China tolerant to interventions and in what situations is China 
reluctant or even resistant to interventions? What factors determine or affect 
China’s attitude and behavior in various illegal interventions?
Contrary to the assumption that China ’s domestic problems are the 
determinants of its foreign policy, this article applies the IR theory of neo-classical 
realism to examine China’s non-intervention policy and argues that its foreign 
policy toward international intervention is mainly motivated by international 
factors and simultaneously constrained by domestic incentives. The analysis is 
designed as follows. First, this article begins with a brief introduction to IMI and 
illegal intervention after the Cold War. Second, China’s reactions to IMI, illegal 
intervention, and other attendant interventions are discussed. This section 
concludes with the implications and provides a theoretical framework to analyze 
China’s non-intervention policy. Third, three cases are analyzed to confirm the 
arguments based on the theoretical framework.
Interpreting IMI and Illegal Intervention
An oft-cited definition of IMI formulated by Person and Baumann (1993) is 
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that “international military interventions are the movement of regular troops or 
forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the 
context of some political issue or dispute.” This definition is inclusive of military 
activities with various purposes, even a war through which the intervening state 
aggressively annexes the target state. Based on the IMI dataset, Figure 1 shows 
the main characteristics of military interventions that have taken place in the 
post-Cold War era.2 Although the standard established by Person and Baumann is 
operationally convenient, the types of skirmishes of two states for disputed issues 
and one state’s annexation of other sovereign states’ territories are rarely 
categorized into the concept of conventional interventions.3 According to the IMI 
dataset updated in 2005, compared with the military interventions during the 
Cold War era, overall military intervention rates have increased in the post-Cold 
War period (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009, p.596). Moreover, major power 
interventions have risen with the increase in number of conflicts and armed forces 
used among non-major power actors (Kisangani & Pickering, 2008).
Despite the restraint of using force in international law and politics, certain 
IMIs are acceptable.4 The United Nations (UN) Charter implies the prohibition of 
all uses of military force, excluding the military activities for self-defense or those 
authorized by the UNSC. Intervention by the UN has legitimacy and is widely 
2. The IMI dataset is housed in Inter- University Consortium of Political and Social Research 
collection at the University of Michigan.
3. The demarcation between military intervention and aggressive war is ambiguous in most of 
cases. Under the condition that one state aims at annexing another sovereign state’s territory, 
these corresponding military actions are seen as aggressive war instead of intervention.
4. According to the UN Charter, it prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state.
Figure 1. Spectrum of IMI
Source: made by the author based on the IMI dataset.
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seen as proper and even desirable (Luard, 1986, pp.157-158). The three types of 
activities on the left side of the spectrum in Figure 1 are less contentious than the 
three on the right side. Using force to evacuate nationals of intervening states is 
practically permissive, and these actions can be supported by the consular 
protection written in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.5 Dispatching 
non-combatants to conflict-affected countries is largely acceptable to provide 
humanitarian assistance and to maintain the political order of the target states. 
The peacekeeping activities mandated by the UNSC are seldom legally polemic 
because of the explicit rules of PKOs.6 Use of force in target states is greatly 
controversial, and this type of intervention usually causes international strife.7 
The illegal military intervention discussed in this article can be classified into the 
category of military strike on the target state.
Illegal intervention in this article refers to the intervening state’s military 
actions that use combatant force in the target state to compel the target state to 
obey the political purpose of intervening states without the support of 
international law or international customary law.8 In other words, this military 
intervention is implemented without the authorization of UNSC.9 Illegal 
intervention can be unilateral activities, such as the Iraq War waged by the US, or 
multilateral behavior, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
bombing of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) regarding Kosovo. 
Some illegal interventions are carried out under the condition that UNSC member 
5. This does not mean that this type of intervention has not been debated. The US justified its 
military intervention in Panama in 1989 by protecting its nationals. This case is taken as US’ 
pretextual intervention by some observers. This behavior of the US has been discussed in the 
academia of international law and politics.
6. PKOs also need UNSC authorization, and they usually do not initiate debates in the sense 
of international law. Nevertheless, some UNSC members have blocked certain PKOs, for 
example, China’s vetoes against the proposed PKOs in Guatemala and Haiti.
7. This article is not meant to discuss the normative issue of illegal intervention and is thus 
guided by whether or not the behavior violates the international law.
8. Despite the fact that the targets of international interventions include states, organizations, 
and individuals, illegal interventions generally aim at the incumbent regime in the target 
country. As far as the counter-terrorism is concerned, the UNSC has adopted resolutions to deal 
with particular organizations or individuals that are suspected of being associated with terrorist. 
International interventions targeting particular individuals and organizations are not 
controversial and hence are viewed as legitimate.
9. It is notable that although countries have different perspectives on specific international 
actions, the illegal intervention in this discussion is not judged by interpretations of individual 
countries. Under the condition that interventions have no legal base, such as the UNSC 
resolution or relevant international covenant, the interventions are viewed as illegal.
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countries disagree with the use of force in addressing specific issues and conflicts, 
and other illegal interventions are not discussed under the UNSC framework. 
Illegal intervention is not isolated. It is associated with other types of 
interventions that deal with a specific international issue, such as UNSC 
sanctions. In this sense, the discussion on the cases of illegal intervention in this 
article includes not only the illegal intervention per se but also the attendant 
negotiations and interventionist resolutions in the UN framework.
The term illegal intervention has rarely been applied in previous academic 
works. First, illegal intervention seldom takes place after the Cold War because 
states usually do not set themselves up on a high-risk and costly road to a 
unilateral military intervention in other states’ conflicts unless they do so for 
their own sake. Purely self-serving interventions in some cases are hardly 
justified, and the intervening countries may face potential punishment from the 
international society. Second, assessing the nature of illegality of certain 
interventions is an after-the-act evaluation and is thus difficult to operate in 
practice. Some interventionist initiatives have been discussed in the UN system 
or other international organizations. Intervening states usually conduct military 
actions after recognizing the international dissent. Note that some military 
actions can be justified by reasons of universal value or regional and international 
order. The extents to which countries are convinced of the justification of military 
interventions are different because of the diverse perspectives of countries. Failure 
to persuade is a probable cause for illegal intervention. Therefore, examining the 
comprehension of countries, particularly the perceptions on military interventions 
of great powers, is necessary. This article attempts to elucidate China’s case to 
explore the non-intervention policy of this non-Western emerging power.
Assessing China’s Non-intervention Policy toward IMI
China’s Responses to IMI
China has long taken the principle of non-intervention as its diplomatic 
dogma and major rhetorical instrument. It generally does not rhetorically approve 
of coercive measures to be imposed on sovereign states. Although China has been 
involved in many interventionist actions, it has restrained itself from conducting 
military interventions since the post-Cold War period started.10 As Lawson and 
10. China has launched military interventions in the Cold War period, such as the 
involvements in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Moreover, China also conducted various 
types of interventions; see Cohen (1973), Ren (2013).
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Tardelli (2003, p.1248) observed, “China’s military interventions have been more 
limited in frequency and scope than those performed by other Great Powers.” The 
IMI dataset attests to this observation (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009, p.597). 
China has incrementally changed its strict interpretation of and approaches to 
IMI. China has objected vehemently to any kind of IMI enacted by the so-called 
Western countries.11 With the expansion of China’s overseas interest (Wang, 2013, 
pp.78-82; Duchâtel, Bräuner, & Hang, 2014), it has loosened its staunch insistence 
on the principle of non-intervention and began to engage in military interventions, 
such as the protection of its nationals and properties abroad (Duchâtel, Bräuner, 
& Hang, 2014), cooperation with other countries in UNSC sanctions (Carlson, 
2006; 2010), and participation in PKOs (Gill, 2007; Gill & Huang, 2009; Karlsson, 
2011).12
The norm of non-intervention undeniably enjoys strong domestic salience in 
China.13 Therefore, China’s rhetorical responses to the use of force are relatively 
consistent. It opposes the use of force and advocates that military intervention is 
counterproductive in gaining the cooperation of target countries to solve problems. 
It asserts that certain military interventions infringe on international norms 
through diplomatic pronouncements and comments. Moreover, China uses its local 
media to denounce the “actual purpose” of some countries’ military intervention. 
From China’s perspective, some intervening countries force a target state to follow 
their value and political systems and eventually to serve their national interests, 
and they may use an authorized UNSC intervention to overthrow a local 
government and to acquire the obedience or compliance of the target state.
China tends to cast negative votes, including abstention and veto, on certain 
initiatives of military intervention put to the UNSC agenda. China has seldom 
vetoed against interventionist initiatives in the UNSC, but it has threatened to 
wield veto power to hinder staunch interventions or to achieve the compromise 
from countries advocating the military intervention in the process of the 
negotiation. China is inclined to acquiesce to international intervention by casting 
11. The term “West” or “Western” refers to the coalition of states, primarily located in Western 
Europe and North America, taking the lead in promoting international interventions.
12. China’s approach to PKOs has changed from initial condemnation and skepticism to 
gradual participation.
13. The concept of domestic salience of norm derived from the IR theory of constructivism, 
which refers to an international norm has been accepted and achieved legitimacy by one state. 
The mainstream constructivists presume that “when stats regularly refer to the norm to describe 
their own behavior and that of others, the validity clams of the norm are no longer controversial 
even if actual behavior continues to violate the norm” (Peevers 2013, p.45; Risse-Kappen, 1994).
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abstention in the UN system to disassociate itself from other Western countries 
and expresses its preferences, perspectives, or attitude. Making a compromise to 
the intervention through abstention reflects China’s concerns about its relations 
with the great powers14 and the impact of a specific military intervention.15
Although China’s disapproval of several military interventions may not 
hinder the interventionist actions beyond the UN framework or dissuade other 
countries from performing interventions, its responses to illegal interventions 
show nuances in terms of discourse and behavior. This article summarizes the 
three possible outcomes of China’s foreign policy based on the degree of the 
country’s responses to cases of illegal intervention. Tolerance indicates that China 
does not condemn and strongly opposes a specific illegal intervention. Reluctant 
compromise indicates that China does not use a veto or threaten to use the veto 
from interventionist resolution in the UN framework, although it expresses its 
strong disapproval of the intervention in diplomatic discourse. Resistance 
indicates that China is intransigently against the intervention with strong 
condemnation and threatens to wield veto power or cast a veto in the UN. China’s 
response to a specific IMI is prudent decision making intertwined with strategic 
considerations at the international level and with national interests at the 
domestic level. The causal relations based on neoclassical realism explain why 
China has different responses to specific interventions.
Causal Mechanism Underlying China’s Non-intervention Policy
Neoclassical realism assumes that systemic factors powerfully pressure the 
foreign behavior of states and that states respond to the international system by 
seeking to control and shape their external environment (Wohlfoth, 2008). 
Systemic dynamics are derived from the distribution of powers under U.S. 
unilateralism in the sovereign states system. Nonetheless, the dynamics affect the 
foreign policy behavior of particular states only through the mediating effect of 
unit-level variables, namely, decision-makers’ perceptions of international 
situations and domestic constraints. In other words, “states conduct foreign policy 
14. Great powers in this article refer to the countries possessing strong political power have 
the legitimacy to decide agenda and rules in international organizations, and whose foreign 
policy greatly influences other countries’ decision-making. In the UN, great powers specifically 
stand for the five permanent members of the Security Council.
15. Through casting abstentions with ambiguous attitudes, on the one hand, China avoids the 
criticism from the advocates of intervention and simultaneously expresses its dissatisfaction 
without changing the consequence; on the other hand, it does not reverse its commitment to non-
intervention.
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based on their assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions” but are 
constrained by domestic concerns (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009, p.26). In 
the causal train of states’ foreign policy behavior, the intervening variable is the 
decision makers’ perceptions of national interest. Neoclassical realism takes the 
concept of state power into account when considering the domestic factors.16
State power is closely associated with state autonomy and state legitimacy. In 
China’s case, maintaining the political survival and legitimacy of the existing 
regime is the crucial objective of its reigning elite. On the international stage, the 
international order based on sovereign rights and the collective security system 
established by the UN are beneficial to China to a larger extent. Maintaining this 
order and promoting China’s reputation are the guarantees for the regime 
survival of the country. The goal of self-preservation forces the Chinese 
government to maintain absolute control and to keep economic development at a 
high rate in the post-Cold War era (Ren, 2013, p.39). Potential foreign intervention 
may threaten China by empowering dissident groups inside the country, such as 
those pushing for the independence of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, among 
others. Moreover, threats to China’s economic interest in the world are part of its 
domestic concerns. Therefore, the high vulnerability of the Chinese government 
that embodies its regime survival, economic development, and domestic issues is 
an important element that influences the country ’s ability to respond to 
international interventions. In sum, this article provides the explanations of 
China’s non-intervention policy that lie in neoclassical realism. As Table 2 depicts, 
the distribution of power under the American unilateralism in the international 
system is the independent variable. The relations between state and society are 
16. State power refers to the ability of state leaders to determine foreign policy free of or out of 
domestic political constraints. On factors that affect the degree of state power, see Taliaferro 
(2006).
Table 1. The theoretical assumptions and logic of neoclassical realism
View of 
international 
system
View of units
Causal logic of neoclassical realism
Independent 
variable
→ Intervening 
variable
→ Dependent 
 variable
Important Differentiated
Systemic 
Incentives
→ Decision-
makers 
→ Foreign 
Policy
↑
Domestic constraints
Source: Ren (2014, p.265).
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taken as intervening variables. The three possible outcomes of China’s foreign 
policy, namely, tolerance, reluctant compromise, and resistance, are dependent 
variables.
Case Studies
This article presents three cases, namely, NATO’s bombing of the FRY 
regarding Kosovo, the Iraq War, and the Russian intervention in Ukraine over 
Crimea, to test the arguments discussed in the previous section by using archival 
evidence and secondary sources. It is appropriate to explore the three cases for 
examining China’s non-intervention policy. First, they are not only quintessential 
illegal interventions but also typical military interventions conducted by great 
powers in the post-Cold War period. The three cases have been given international 
attention and are controversial both in the academic and in the practical fields. 
Second, China acted differently when facing similar cases. For instance, in terms 
of issue area, the cases of the Kosovo Crisis and the Crimean Issue are similar. 
However, China showed opposite responses to the two cases. Regarding the 
strategic context, the cases of the Kosovo Crisis and the Iraq War are alike. 
China’s foreign policies in the two cases were different. Third, China trapped 
between many competing interests in facing these three cases. Therefore, the 
extent of China’s reactions to the three cases is different, signifying its interest in 
and perception of a specific intervention underlying the decision- making process.
Case One: The Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999)
The Kosovo War was the first time that Western countries attacked a 
sovereign country for humanitarian purposes in the post-Cold War period. This 
case is significant in observing China’s foreign policy as China extremely opposed 
the West-led military interventions. The crisis posed a challenge for China at that 
time. On the one hand, China had been negotiating with the US to join the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Supporting the Serbian government obviously seemed 
Table 2. Motivation of China’s non-intervention policy
Systemic incentive Internal factors
Outcomes (toward 
interventions)
Distribution of power 
under us unipolarism 
→
State –societal relations 
(Regime survival; 
Economic development; 
Domestic issues)
→
Tolerance
Reluctant compromise
Resistance
Source: Ren (2014, p.267), adjusted by the author.
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irrational for China, which stood on the opposite side of the US. On the other 
hand, the humanitarian interventions in Kosovo contradicted the principle of non-
intervention by which China has abided. China disagrees with any military 
intervention in a sovereign state to support secessionist movements. Therefore, 
exploring China’s responses to this crisis can explain the factors determining and 
affecting its foreign policy.
The Kosovo crisis was caused by ethnical conflicts between Albanians and 
Serbs in Serbia. Kosovo, which is mainly populated by Albanians, an ethnic 
minority, used to be a province of Serbia. The proportion of Albanians in the total 
population was approximately 90 per cent during the Kosovo crisis. The ethnical 
conflict was historically rooted, and it continued for more than half a century. The 
conflict intensified because of the revival of the Greater Serbian nationalism and 
ethnic policies, particularly the removal of the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 that 
was implemented by Slobodan Miloševi㶛, the former president of the FRY. 
Inspired by the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Kosovar Albanians started 
to pursue a formal statehood. They held a referendum on independence and 
elected Ibrahim Rugova as their unofficial president (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p.11). 
The international community did not recognize the political pursuits of the 
Kosovar Albanians until the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched the first 
attack against a Serbian police patrol in 1996. The KLA, which was composed of 
separatist Albanian guerrillas, was initially labeled as terrorists by the US (BBC, 
1998). It intensified the fights with Serbs and eventually controlled parts of the 
province.
Although Miloševi㶛 insisted that the Kosovo issue was a domestic problem of 
Serbia, the international community decided to be involved in the crisis when it 
realized that this intra-state violence could become a civil war and spread to 
neighboring Macedonia. In 1998, the UNSC adopted three sanction-related 
resolutions against the FRY concerning Kosovo (Table 3). However, the civil war 
did not ease under the UNSC resolutions. In March 1999, NATO launched a 
bombing campaign against Serbia after the failure of negotiations and mediations 
initiated by the intervening countries between the Serbian government and the 
secessionists.17 This military action did not achieve the UNSC mandate and thus 
invoked numerous normative problems and debates. NATO members justified this 
military action as a humanitarian intervention, but some countries, particularly 
Russia and China, remained skeptical about the true intention behind this 
17. Miloševi㶛 rejected the Rambouillet Accord in early 1999.
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military attack.
China did not support the international interventions in Kosovo when the 
UNSC put this issue on the agenda. The Chinese delegations to the UN denied 
the international character of the situation in Kosovo and emphasized that the 
UNSC interference did not conform to its principled position: “Kosovo crisis should 
be resolved through negotiations between both parties concerned on the basis of 
the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY” 
(UNSC, 1998a). China repeated this opinion regularly in the UN and sequentially 
cast abstentions from the voting of all UNSC resolutions relevant to Kosovo. It 
doubted the intervening states’ pretext of dealing with a humanitarian crisis (UN 
General Assembly, 1998, p.22) and was concerned that the outcome of the 
involvement would set a bad precedent in the future for intervention in 
Table 3.  Voting records regarding the Kosovo Crisis in the UNSC (1998-
1999)
Date Resolution
Voting 
Summary
China’s vote Contents of the resolution
Mar. 31, 
1998
1160 14, 1, 0 Abstention
To impose arms embargo against FRY 
including the Kosovo area.
Sept. 23, 
1998
1199 14, 1, 0 Abstention
Call for ceasefire and dialogues among 
the parties concerned, and to require the 
Yugoslavian army to immediately stop 
all actions on civilians and to allow the 
EU watch group to conduct effective 
monitoring in Kosovo.
Oct. 24, 
1998
1203
13, 2, 0 
(China and 
Russia)
Abstention
The  UNSC demands  Yugos lav ian 
government and Kosovar Albanian 
leadership to comply fully and swiftly 
with Resolutions 1160 and 1199 and 
c o o p e r a t e  f u l l y  w i t h  t h e  O S C E 
Verification Mission in Kosovo and the 
NATO Air Verification Mission over 
Kosovo.
May 14, 
1999
1239
13, 2, 0 
(China and 
Russia)
Non-voting
To  inv i t e  the  UNHCR and  o ther 
international humanitarian relief 
organizations to extend relief assistance 
to the internally displaced people in 
Kosovo, the Republic of Montenegro and 
other parts of the FRY, as well as other 
civilians affected by the ongoing crisis.
June 10, 
1999
1244 14, 1, 0 Abstention
To approve of the agreement between 
Yugoslavia and NATO.
Source:  Wu, (2010, p. 77), adjusted by the author. Official Document System (ODS) of the United 
Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).
Note: voting is written as “aye, abstention (non-voting), and veto.”
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secessionist movements of sovereign states under the guise of humanitarian 
purpose (UNSC, 1998b). The Kosovo crisis is strongly associated with China’s 
domestic concerns that movements of secessionists, such as the Tibetan and 
Uyghur separationist, would likely result in foreign interventions and would 
challenge China’s sovereignty. Despite China’s sympathy for the FRY, the 
unanimity of the international community softened China’s intransigence on the 
UNSC sanctions over the Kosovo crisis, as exemplified by Resolutions 1160 and 
1199.
Nevertheless, China’s opposition to NATO’s proposal of military intervention 
in Kosovo was adamant, and its resistance was explicitly expressed when its 
argument was shared by Russia, another great power. Before the adoption of 
UNSC Resolution 1203, which avoided an outright threat to use force against the 
FRY, China and Russia threatened to veto a resolution that would have permitted 
military action by NATO (Ibrahim, 1998). During the UNSC debate on Resolution 
1203, China explained its position as follows: “NATO’s threat of military action 
constituted unlawful interference in the FRY’s internal affairs, and it condemned 
NATO for acting without consulting with or seeking the authorization of the 
UNSC” (Davis, 2011, p.248).  Even if the easing language about the threat of using 
force mollified the two countries, China and Russia still abstained from voting on 
Resolution 1203. For China, the resolution “does not entail any authorization of 
using force or threatens to use force against the FRY” (UNSC, 1998c).18
China immediately condemned NATO’s bombing campaign in the FRY in 
March 1999. Through a strongly worded front-page commentary in People’s Daily, 
the Chinese media considered NATO’s military action to be “brazenly and brutally 
trampling on the UN Charter and violating its own principle of self-defense” 
(Mowbray, 1999). The Chinese government resonated the comments and 
denounced NATO’s intervention as a violation of the accepted international law in 
the March 24, 1999 UNSC meeting (UNSC, 1999a). Unlike the Russian opinion of 
the NATO strikes being an “open aggression” as stated by former Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin, China criticized the illegality of the intervention that 
bypassed the UNSC and the Western propensity to power politics, that is, the 
strong bullying the weak (UNSC, 1999a). Moreover, China was in favor of a UNSC 
draft resolution proposed by Russia that declared NATO’s strikes as a violation of 
the UN Charter and “demanding an immediate halt to NATO’s attacks and the 
resumption of negotiations,” but this draft resolution was rejected through a vote 
18. Qin Huasun, the Chinese delegate to the UN, made this statement after his abstention.
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of 12 to 3 (UNSC, 1999b; Waikato Times, 1999). During the Kosovo War, the 
Chinese media sided with the FRY and focused on the suffering of the Serbs 
caused by the NATO’s bombing (Poole, 1999).
China’s denunciation of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo culminated on May 7, 
1999 when the US bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, leaving 3 journalists 
dead and 20 Chinese citizens injured. China then directed its anger toward the 
US. Anti-American protests intensified across the country shortly after the 
bombing. The Chinese government did not restrain this sentiment. Former 
Premier Li Peng even instigated animosity among the public by declaring that 
“the whole Chinese people is united in hatred of the common enemy̶ the US” 
(Yahuda, 2002, p.199). China then suspended all military exchange and human 
rights talks with the US (Kucharski, 2012, p.67). Almost all Chinese scholars 
attributed the motive of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo to US geopolitical 
interest. They pointed out that the military intervention in Kosovo was never a 
contingency (Guo, 1999; Zhai, 1999). Rather, it was a US conspiracy that used 
NATO to carry out hegemony and to impair Russia’s geopolitical influence on the 
Balkans in the name of humanitarian intervention (Feng, 1999; Kong, 1999).
It should be noted that China played a marginal role in resolving the Kosovo 
crisis although its rhetoric was particularly striking. Russia’s response to this 
specific issue affected China’s perception and decision-making. Russia has 
centuries-old religious and cultural ties with the Serbs (Goshko, 1998). The 
Balkans is a historically “turbulent frontier” that Russia and European countries 
became embroiled in with interventions and conflicts.19 On May 14, 1999, when 
the UNSC used Resolution 1239 to invite humanitarian organizations to extend 
relief assistance to the refugees in the area, both China and Russia did not vote to 
express their disagreement. China did not participate in the negotiations among 
the concerned parties during the Kosovo crisis. Russia attended the mediations 
but failed to deter the NATO’s military attack. In May 1999, Russia continued the 
mediation between the FRY and the intervening countries through the G8 and 
dialogues with Miloševi㶛. Moscow made a compromise to other intervening 
countries, and it successfully persuaded Serbia to withdraw all forces from Kosovo 
and allow the UN civil mission and the Kosovo Protection Force, which was 
controlled by NATO, to enter the province. Thus, Russia cast an affirmative vote 
on the consequential UNSC Resolution 1244. Without Russia’s support, China 
19. Woodward (2013) applied this concept of the “turbulent frontier” to describe foreign 
interventions in the Balkan theatre. The concept was originally used by Galbraith (1960) to 
explain the British imperial expansion in the mid-19th century.
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abstained from voting on the resolution but kept its fierce disapproving position 
in rhetoric.20
China’s response to the interventions in Kosovo was unprecedentedly 
vehement and its discourse was consistent, insisting on the principle of non-
intervention. As China has a similar domestic problem to that of Kosovo, it was 
wary of establishing a precedent that would legitimately permit foreign 
interventions in affairs of states caused by ethnic problems.21 From China’s 
perspective, the military intervention in Kosovo posed a threat, at least a potential 
threat, to its sovereignty and security. However, it also made a compromise to 
certain international interventions, such as UNSC sanctions, as consensus had 
been reached in the international community. China’s attitude became recalcitrant 
to the interventions when seconded by Russia. China’s reiteration of the illegality 
of the NATO military interventions revealed its concern about the decreased 
authority of the UN challenged by the power politics of Western countries. China’s 
criticism directly shifted to the US since the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade. China was not tolerant to the US behavior that not only challenged the 
security system in which China enjoyed great power status but also harmed 
China’s reputation and the security of Chinese citizens. Comparably, the economic 
factor played a small role in China’s decision-making process as China intensely 
20. Shen Guofan stated in the UNSC meeting, “NATO created an extremely dangerous 
precedent in the history of international relations…In essence, the ‘human rights over 
sovereignty’ theory serves to infringe upon the sovereignty of other States and to promote 
hegemonism under the purposes and principles of the UN Charter” (UNSC, 1999c).
21. The Chinese delegate highlighted the scope of issues addressed by the UNSC in the 
meeting after the Resolution 1244 has passed, “Fundamentally speaking, ethnic problems within 
a State should be settled in a proper manner by its own Government and people, through the 
adoption of sound policies. They must not be used as an excuse for external intervention, much 
less used by foreign States as an excuse for the use of force” (UNSC, 1999c, pp.8-9).
Table 4. Causal mechanism of China’s foreign policy to the Kosovo Crisis
International 
factor
Domestic factor Outcome Instances
International 
consensus
→
Regime survival (security and 
reputation)̶ indirectly concerned
Domestic issues (ethnical 
secessionists)̶ directly concerned
→ Reluctant 
compromise
Res. 1160, 
1199, 1244.
International 
dissent (NATO 
led by US VS. 
Russia)
→
Regime survival (security and 
reputation)̶ directly concerned
Domestic issues (ethnical 
secessionists)̶ directly concerned
→ Resistance
Res.1203, 
1239; draft 
resolution 
proposed by 
Russia.
Source: made by author.
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opposed the US even with the risk of potential economic loss during the 
negotiation on China entering the WTO. This crisis consequently prompted and 
deepened the strategic cooperation between China and Russia.
Case Two: The Iraq War (2002-2003)
The Iraq War is undoubtedly an international affair that received 
considerable international attention. It showed the maximum of the 
unconstrained power of the US and symbolized neo-interventionism at that time. 
The military intervention in Iraq did not obtain authorization from the UNSC and 
lacked advocates except for the UK and a few other countries. The Iraq War 
caused a dilemma in China’s foreign policy. On the one hand, China would likely 
sacrifice its economic interest if it intransigently resisted the US behavior by 
advocating the principle of non-intervention, as the US had already strengthened 
its presence in the Middle East through the war and would probably cut off 
China’s energy supply form Iraq once tension in the bilateral relationship 
escalated. On the other hand, the Iraq War could cause an insecure and unstable 
situation in the region, which would eventually affect the economic and security 
interests of China. Thus, examining how China used the non-intervention policy 
in the face of the Iraq War and why Beijing had distinct responses to the issue is 
worthwhile.
The problems of Iraq, including the unwelcome regime and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), had perplexed the US for many years. Former US President 
George W. Bush planned to use force to oust the Saddam regime when he took 
office in 2001. The US pushed the UN to interfere in Iraq through the reasons 
that the Iraqi government possessed WMD and that Iraq did not cooperate with 
the inspections conducted by the United Nations Special Commission and 
International Atomic Energy Agency.22 UNSC members engaged in the issue of the 
Iraqi WMD but were not convinced of the necessity and justification of using force. 
The efforts of the US and the UK to gain the support of the UNSC to use force in 
Iraq failed, but it did not stop the two countries from waging war on Iraq in March 
2003.
The intensive negotiations and debates continued when the US released the 
22. In 1986 an Australian scientist first discovered that the Iraqi government developed WMD. 
Iraq’s WMD ambition was confirmed when Saddam used chemical weapons in Halabjia in 1988. 
The UNSC interfered in this issue by imposing a series of sanctions to punish Iraq’s objective 
and to force the Iraqi government to eradicate its WMD since the aftermath of the Gulf War 
(Malone, 2006, pp.152-184).
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information that the Iraqi government had continued its WMD program and had 
likely developed the nuclear capability. The Bush administration was enthusiastic 
to overthrow the Saddam regime by force, and the US induced the P5 not to 
hinder the planned military intervention in Iraq in the UN (The Associated Press, 
2002). However, France and Russia tried to block the UN approval and preferred 
to address the WMD issue in Iraq through political talks and mediation (Coker, 
2002). Recognizing the rift that emerged in the UNSC, Saddam tried to gain P5 
support against US military actions. China conveyed its disapproval of the war 
option after a meeting between former Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and 
his Iraqi counterpart Naji Sabri, and persuaded Iraq to implement the UN 
resolutions calling for WMD inspections (Morning Star, 2002).
China’s responses toward the US plan to attack Iraq were relatively 
moderate, at least not as harsh as those of the Europeans. France, Germany, and 
Russia rather than China announced their strong opposition to the US proposal 
after Bush pursued a resolution to conduct a military intervention in Iraq for its 
failure to disarm before the General Assembly (Paul, 2005, p.65). The US and the 
UK introduced three resolution drafts to the UNSC in October and November 
2002 that implicitly authorized the use of force. France and Russia also issued 
drafts regarding Iraq in the UNSC. 23 Both advocates and opponents of military 
intervention made a compromise. The UNSC then unanimously approved 
Resolution 1441 with ambiguous language but with no threat of using force 
(UNSC, 2002a).24 No evidence could be found that China used its veto power to 
threaten the US. China, taking the stance of France and Russia, maintained that 
the resolution “no longer includes automaticity for authorizing the use of force” 
(UNSC, 2002b).
Despite a vigorous opposition from the international community, the US 
insisted on using force in Iraq, asserting that Iraq still possessed WMD, and thus 
violated Resolution 1441 (Paul, 2005, p.66).25 France, Germany, and Russia 
respectively released the signals that they would block the military action in the 
UN (Borger, MacAskill, & Tisdall, 2003; Peel, 2003). China expressed that its 
position was close to that of France on January 23, 2003 (Ambrose, 2003). On 
23. See the relevant archive on the website UN Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq, 
available at http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html.
24. Note that the two sides harbored different expectations to UNSC involvement and 
interpreted the Resolution 1441 in different ways. The details see Malone (2006, p.168).
25. Former French President Chirac’s personal envoy was given a clear signal that the US was 
intent on a military solution when meeting with the US National security Adviser Rice (Peel, 
2003).
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February 10, 2003, China then supported the joint statement issued by these 
three countries that called for prompting weapons inspection and a concerted 
effort to disarm Iraq through peaceful means (Finn, 2003). Although the UN’s 
chief weapons inspector Hans Blix confirmed in the UNSC that no evidence of 
WMD had been found on February 14, 2003, the US, UK, and Spain still drafted a 
resolution to the UNSC, announcing that “Iraq had failed its final opportunity to 
comply fully with resolution 1411” (Paul, 2005, p.66). On March 5, 2003, France, 
Germany, and Russia reacted that they would not pass the proposed resolution 
that authorized the use of force. China stated the same position as the three 
countries on the following day (Glennon, 2003, p.18).
China’s response to the Iraq War was far from fierce. When the US invasion of 
Iraq started, China accused the US of “violating the UN charter and norms of 
international law” and appealed to the US to stop its military action, but it evaded 
the question of whether China would condemn the US in the UN (Renmin Wang 
[People's Net], 2003). The Chinese government strictly controlled the public 
opinions at that time, such as by restraining its media from covering the 
comments of nationalistic rhetoric that could offend the US and by forbidding a 
protest against the war (Cheng, 2003). Former Chinese President Hu Jintao 
publicly set up China’s position on the US-Iraq conflict in a high-level meeting 
that discussed the crisis in Iraq. As President Hu stated, “China was opposed to 
the US-led war” but “emphasized that China should avoid direct confrontation 
with the US” (Cheong, 2003). China did not subscribe to the military intervention 
imposed by foreign countries or international organization to topple the 
incumbent regime of the target state. Zhang Qiyue, former Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokeswoman, expressed that China had always maintained that 
international conflicts should not be addressed through military force (PLA Daily, 
2004). Nevertheless, China refrained from condemning the US and merely called 
for a peaceful resolution of the Iraq issue through diplomatic means (Chih, 2011, 
p.145).
China’s discourse on using force in Iraq was consistent. China insisted on 
addressing the Iraq issue through diplomacy under the UNSC framework to 
constrain the US and to deprive the US of legitimacy of using force (Nye, 2003, 
p.66). However, China did not directly challenge the US. In the process of the 
negotiation on the Iraq issue and the Iraq War, China did not play a significant 
role and did not lead the opposition, “leaving it to France to head up the awkward 
squad” (The Irish Times, 2003). France was the outspoken country that opposed 
the military intervention in Iraq. Russia and Germany cooperated with France, 
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and together they blocked the planning military acts of the Anglo-Saxon alliance. 
China expressed its preference for diplomatic method and its similar position to 
France once Paris had the initiative to impede the use of force. China’s being in 
favor of the other major powers and its disagreement with the US military 
interventions demonstrated its concern about the strengthened unilateralism of 
the US that would impair the authority of the UNSC and the international order 
based on the sovereign states system. In short, how the other second-tier major 
powers reacted to the US military intervention affected China’s decision-making 
process to a large extent.
China ambiguously responded to the military intervention instead of showing 
an intransigent opposition. Although the presence of the US in the Middle East 
could generate an adverse effect on China’s reputation and regional interests, the 
impact was indirect from the Chinese perspective (Zhang S., 2003). Economic 
development has been on top of China’s political agenda, which is closely 
associated with the legitimacy of the current regime. In terms of resource 
importation, China was concerned that the US would disregard all the contracts 
for Iraqi oil exploration signed with Beijing if it antagonized the US. China was 
hesitant to oppose the US in this issue at the cost of its economic interest. 
Moreover, the concerns of its domestic issues were precluded. The 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the US lead to the anti-terrorism movements across the world. It was 
also a turning point in the Sino-American relations since the Kosovo war. China 
proactively participated in the movements and cooperated with the US. This 
participation partly accounted for China suffering from Islamic secessionist 
insurgents in Xinjiang. The US pursued China’s modest stance on the US-led war 
by “designating the provincial Islamic group as a terrorist organization” (The 
Global and Mail, 2002). Furthermore, China obtained the verbal promise of the 
US that Washington would not back Taiwan’s independence in exchange for 
China’s mild anti-war stance (Ma, 2003). In conclusion, China’ domestic concerns, 
particularly its economic development and domestic issues, constrained its foreign 
Table 5. Causal mechanism of China’s foreign policy to the Iraq war
International factors Domestic factors Outcomes
International compromise 
and dissent (US and UK 
VS France and Russia)
→
Regime survival (security and reputation) 
̶indirectly concerned
Economic development (resource import)̶
directly concerned
Domestic issues (terrorism and Taiwan 
issues)̶ directly concerned
→ Reluctant 
compromise
Source: author
Mu REN
146
policy as regards the issue and diluted its divergent attitude on the US.
Case Three: The Crimean Issue (February – June 2014)
The Crimean issue has recently become a focal point in international affairs. 
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine over the Crimean issue clearly violates 
the norm of sovereignty, especially the respect for territorial integrity and the 
principle of non-intervention. However, Russia has justified its military 
intervention as protecting the Russians and its national interest in this region. 
China’s responses and the underlying factors of its foreign policy in the Crimean 
crisis and IMI bear scrutiny. China’s reactions reveal how it formulates its foreign 
policy when facing an illegal military intervention conducted by a like-minded 
great power and an issue intimately related to its domestic concerns. Therefore, 
the examination of China’s foreign policy to the Crimean issues shows the extent 
to which Beijing adheres to its diplomatic principle of non-intervention and what 
its diplomatic priorities are.
The Crimean issue in 2014 was directly aroused by the Ukrainian revolution 
that took place after a series of insurgencies caused by the termination of an 
agreement on closer trade ties with the European Union (EU) by the Ukrainian 
government in November 2013. Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian President of 
Ukraine, was deposed by the parliament and fled to Russia in February 2014. 
Dissatisfied with the new government, pro-Russian gunmen seized the building of 
Crimea’s parliament on February 27, 2014. On the same day, Sergey Aksyonov, a 
pro-Russian politician in Ukraine, was selected by the Crimean parliament as the 
new Prime Minister. He then declared the holding of a referendum on the 
Crimean autonomy. On February 28, unidentified militants occupied two 
international airports in the Crimean Peninsula, and Russia dispatched armored 
vehicles to the region in the name of protecting the security of the Black Sea fleet 
stationed in Sevastopol.26 Russia's parliament ratified Vladimir Putin's request to 
employ force on Ukraine to protect Russian interests, which started Russia’s 
military intervention with interior legitimacy in Ukraine. Crimea's secession 
referendum on whether or not to rejoin Russia was passed with 97 per cent 
affirmative votes on March 16.27 On March 18, Russia signed the formal bill to 
26. Ukraine minister accused Russia of seizing the airports (Sekretarev, 2014). Russia stated 
that any movements of the Black Sea Fleet “did not require any coordination” (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014).
27. Russia stated it would support Crimea if the region votes to leave Ukraine. See BBC 
NEWs- Ukraine Crisis Timeline, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-26248275.
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absorb the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation.28
Despite the fact that the Ukrainian crisis led to the Crimean issue, historical, 
ethnical, and geopolitical issues complicated the secession of Crimea. Crimea was 
annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783 and remained part of Russia until 1954 
when it was transferred to Ukraine under Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev 
during the commemoration of the 300th anniversary of Ukraine becoming part of 
the Tsardom of Russia. The severe national policy in the early 20th century caused 
the tartars, the original residents of Crimea, to be expelled. A large number of 
Russians immigrated to this area and became the ethnic majority, and ethnic 
Russians account for approximately 60 per cent of the total population in Crimea. 
Russian is the daily language in Crimea, and more than 70 per cent of residents 
consider Russian as their native language. People of Crimea have longed for the 
return to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union because of their strong 
ethnical ties to Russia. Thus, Russia played the Crimea card to manipulate its 
relationship with Ukraine after the Cold War.29 Crimea is strategically significant 
to Russia because of the Black Sea Fleet, Russia’s naval base, stationed in the port 
of Sevastopol (Schwartz, 2014). Thus, the majority of Russian people widely 
supported the government’s military action to annex Crimea (Pew Research, 
2014).
In the aftermath of the military intervention in Ukraine, countries from the 
international community expressed their diverse concerns. For instance, the US 
condemned Russia’s aggression and imposed sanctions against the persons they 
considered to have contributed to the situation in Ukraine and threatened the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine (US Department of State, 2014). The EU and its 
member countries respectively took similar steps to impose sanctions against 
Russia.30 The US submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC one day prior to the 
referendum to call for the recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and 
the invalidity of the referendum without citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(UNSC, 2014a). The draft resolution was not adopted because of Russia’s veto. 
However, the non-binding draft resolution with similar contents was approved 
with 100 affirmative votes, 58 abstentions, and 11 vetoes in the UN General 
28. This article takes the military act of Russia in Ukraine over the Crimean Peninsula as a 
military intervention rather an aggressive annexation as the Crimean people decided to join 
Russia by referendum.
29. Crimea was an autonomous republic under the Ukraine government. It was failed to 
separate from Ukraine before 2014 majorly because of lacking Russia’s support.
30. For reference, see the blog- Russian Sanctions Update by Baker and McKenzie, available 
at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/sanctionsnews/.
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Assembly in March 2014 (UN General Assembly, 2014a).
China’s response to the illegal intervention was calm and ambiguous. It 
neither condemned Russia’s military action nor chose the stand of either Russia 
or the West. China eschewed commenting on Russia’s military intervention by 
applying the principle of non-intervention (China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
[CFM], 2014). Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “nothing could be 
constructed as support for Russia” in a phone conversation with Putin on March 4 
(Pei, 2014). In addition, China abstained from voting on the draft resolutions in 
the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of 
China to the UN, said after its abstention in the UNSC that China “sought a 
balanced solution to the conflict within a framework of law and order” and called 
on the relevant parties not to do any actions that would further escalate the 
conflict (UNSC, 2014b). He underlined China’s impartial approach to the issue of 
Ukraine and its preference for resolving the problem in the manner of dialogues 
in the UN General Assembly on March 25 (UN General Assembly, 2014b). China’s 
abstentions appeared neutral, but they implicitly demonstrated that Beijing 
relented to Russia’s military actions.
China’s political pronouncement was consistent with the principle of non-
intervention, but its attitude and behavior were incongruent with the discourse. 
Its response was also at odds with that to the Kosovo crisis, which is inherently 
similar toward the Crimea issue. However, China’s foreign policy to this issue was 
rational and flexible. First, Russia ’s military intervention violated the 
international norm enshrined in international treaties particularly composed of 
the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Budapest Memorandum.31 China 
was hardly in favor of this infringement, as the public support for Russia must 
dramatically discredit its pronounced commitment to the non-intervention policy. 
Second, China could not agree with Russia’s use of force, a foreign military 
intervention to support the ethnic secessionism in other counties. For example, 
China Central Television (CCTV) did not emphasize the Russian propaganda but 
highlighted the efforts the US and Germany made to alleviate the situation 
during the Ukrainian crisis (Francis, 2014). Therefore, China took a cautious 
approach to Russia’s behavior. On the one hand, China was reluctant to side with 
31. In 1994, three countries of the US, the UK, and Russia and Ukraine achieved an 
agreement required by former Ukraine President Kuchma, and the three countries’ president or 
Prime Minister personally signed the Budapest Memorandum. The three countries pledged to 
“respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty and its existing borders”, and “to refine from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine” 
(Onyschuk, 2014).
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the West, especially with the US, to alienate Moscow. From China’s perspective, 
the Ukrainian crisis was a consequence of the geopolitical competition between 
the West and Russia (He, 2014; Zhang W., 2014). Thus, the Chinese officials 
expressed China’s tolerance to the Russian intervention by highlighting the 
backdrop of the issue and deploring the violence without designating the specific 
conductors (Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], 2014).32
Domestic factors also affected China’s calculation of cost and benefit in the 
Crimean issue. First, its neighboring countries and the US have pressured China 
for its assertiveness in claiming the disputed territories in the South China Sea 
and the East China Sea. A potentially strategic cooperation with Russia will be 
beneficial for China to deter the US. Second, the importation of natural gas from 
Russia will ease China’s increasing pressure from energy demands. Russia’s 
activities in the aftermath of the Crimean issue have satisfied China ’s 
expectations. On May 20, 2014, Putin officially visited China. In the following day, 
the presidents of the two countries attended the signing ceremony of the 
cooperation of importing natural gas from Russia to China, an agreement that 
China and Russia had negotiated for almost 2 decades. Russia made a great 
concession on the price of natural gas, as Putin was eager to complete this agenda 
during his visit; this concession depicted Russia ’s strategic intention of 
guaranteeing China’s moderate position by offering special incentives to attract 
Beijing.33  China did not presume that the military action on Crimea would be 
repeated in China given that Russia needed its political support. China’s concern 
about the potential foreign intervention caused by ethnic secessionism could be 
excluded.
32. Chinese diplomatic officials used the Chinese words, shichu youyin (事出有因 ) and qianze 
baoli (谴责暴力 ), to  comment the Crimea issue.
33. Although the two countries did not publicize the ultimate price of natural gas, Putin made 
a joke to China’s official who visited Russia that the Chinese negotiators drank a great amount 
of blood of their Russian counterparts (International Bussiness Times, 2014).
Table 6. Causal mechanism of China’s foreign policy to the Crimea issue
International factors Domestic factors Outcomes
International dissent 
(Western countries VS 
Russia)
→
Regime survival (security and reputation)̶ 
directly concerned
Economic development (energy demands)̶ 
directly concerned
Domestic issues̶ strongly relevant but 
indirectly concerned
→ Tolerance
Source: author
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Conclusion
China’s non-intervention policy has incrementally changed in the post-Cold 
War period, albeit remaining flexible and pragmatic. Its approaches to military 
intervention are typical and evident. The scope of acceptable interventions was 
broadened in China’s perception because of its gradually increasing overseas 
interest. Nevertheless, China did not abandon its non-intervention policy. Rather, 
it only refrained from participating in military interventions and judged them by 
applying the principle of non-intervention. China ’s responses to certain 
interventions with international controversy or even illegality are prudent. 
Although China is one of the P5 in the UNSC, it plays a marginal role in 
addressing certain international affairs to which it does not have a high level of 
commitment. China can only do so much to counter the military intervention 
beyond the UN. Nevertheless, because of its growing power, China’s attitude also 
influences the intention of intervening countries.
In general, China does not approve of the use of force in resolving 
international conflicts and problems. Its political discourse is coherent in facing 
various illegal interventions. China continuously presents its adherence to the 
principle of non-intervention and prefers to address international issues through 
political dialogues. However, China’s responses to illegal interventions vary in 
different degrees, as depicted by its attitude, such as commenting on specific 
interventions, and its behavior, such as the votes it cast in the UN framework 
regarding intervention. China ’s attitude and behavior as regards illegal 
intervention depend on the responses of the major powers and the correlation of 
the issue with its domestic concerns. China tends to comply with the international 
consensus, albeit reluctantly. Under the condition that a rift has occurred in the 
international community, China ’s responses will be ambiguous. China ’s 
perceptions of how intervention influences its national interests shape the extent 
to which it will make a compromise.
Three cases have been discussed to prove the arguments in this article. Three 
cases belong to the category of illegal intervention, but the analyses have not been 
limited to this characteristic. Discussions on these cases underline the 
determining role of international factors in forming China’s non-intervention 
policy. The argument and theoretical framework presented in this article have 
several contributions to the literature. The argument expands our knowledge of 
China’s foreign policy formulation by specifying the conditions under which China 
is likely to conform to the principle of non-intervention and under which it tends 
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to override the principle when facing international intervention. The framework 
of the causal mechanism provided in this article can be applied to examine 
China’s foreign policy. It will help us obtain a clearer picture of China’s diplomatic 
attitude and behavior toward IMI, especially toward illegal intervention. 
Furthermore, this article advances the application of the neoclassical realism in 
foreign policy analysis.
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